This series started with my intention to show how Karl Popper-style “critical rationalism,” especially as interpreted by Imre Lakatos, is a useful motivation for scientists and science-adjacent people. But as I wrote, I realized their methodology fails what I think of as a basic purpose of any methodology: to prevent frail mortals from pointing to something outside themselves that just so happens to justify their biases.
I lay the groundwork for a discussion of Lakatos by talking about the intellectual issues of his time.
I outline critical rationalism using a specific example and lay out its key claims.
Prelude to a discussion of blind spots
If you understand the personal histories of Popper and Lakatos, some of their later claims are more understandable. But we don’t have to agree with them.
(I’m obliged to admit at this point that I’m not a Marxist, but I generally object to unfair attacks.)
Both Popper and Lakatos claim Marxists made grand predictions that didn’t come true, then Marxists reacted by making hand-wavey arguments about how Marx was right all along.
I explain that one prediction they claimed failed was not actually the prediction that was made. What Marx admitted as a possibility is what actually happened, but the critical rationalists gave Marxists no credit for that. This is a first hint that critical rationalists are fairly indifferent to what actually happens.
Background: actually, Marxists were better than that
The Popper/Lakatos line is that Marxists predicted the revolution would happen first in the most industrialized states, but were flummoxed when it happened in practically-feudal Russia.
In reality, Marx shifted to predicting that a revolution in Russia would happen before the actual pan-European revolution. And the actual Russian revolutionaries didn’t shrug at being first but were desperate to figure out what to do next, given that the industrialized states didn’t seem exactly eager to revolt.
The previous post was for people who care about the details. This is a more detail-free explanation of how Lakatos and Popper misrepresented the Marxist-Leninists.
You don’t have to be a Marxist-Leninist to be annoyed by misrepresentation by someone’s intellectual opponents.
A swerve in the series: mental habits
I realized the series had landed in a wildly different place than I originally intended and take stock. I decided on an overarching theme: that critical rationalism could be viewed from various perspectives. So the rest of the series would do that.
Science and the mirror of philosophy (36 Views of Mount CritRat)
The critical rationalists have the intellectual habits of philosophers, not of scientists. That makes it hard for them to understand what scientists do.
Waterfall science (36 Views of Mount CritRat)
The critical rationalists don’t care to think hard about experiments. They’re theorist-centered. That’s a problem.
The hero’s journey (36 Views of Mount CritRat)
The critical rationalists are intensely interested in The Great Men of Science. That limits their understanding of all the rest of science.
The incomplete API (36 Views of Mount CritRat)
I got a bit frustrated at critical rationalism’s goal to regulate science. It is vastly insufficient.
What’s up with quantum mechanics? (36 Views of Mount CritRat)
The critical rationalists are really upset with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, in a way that triggers my “why is this person so obsessed about that? It’s weird.” They dislike instrumental theories a whole lot.
Instrumentalism and shades of grey (36 Views of Mount CritRat)
I elaborate on the theme of “instrumental science is actually OK, sometimes.”
I correct an error (36 Views of Mount CritRat)
I goofed, which leads to a discussion of Lakatos’s opinion about Bohr vs. Newton, which is really an argument about methodology.
I finish with three stories of discovery that do not match the critical rationalist playbook.
The series kind of fizzles out.